Security measures and emergency response guidance

Version history

December 2023 Rev. 1.1 – Page 2, template and bookmarking updated; no change to content

August 2021 Rev. 1 – Revision and update

2015 – Initial Publication

Summary

The threat to maritime security from piracy, terrorism, criminal acts and regional conflicts continues to pose challenges to shipowners, charterers and crew members. Some regions of the world have a greater security threat than others and common sense dictates that in these higher threat areas, security measures should be of a more demanding and robust nature than in areas where the risk is known to be lower. Since the introduction of the International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and its inclusion in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, companies operating shipping globally have been required to ensure that measures are in place to comply with the requirements of the Code as it applies to their ships and where necessary to their infrastructure ashore in ports and harbours. The aim of this document is to give practical guidance to IMCA member companies about the security measures which should be implemented onboard ships and in port or shore side offices.

In addition to this, there is the growing threat of cyber-attack. This threat is related to the huge expansion of electronic and digital control systems world-wide, which have become commonplace on new and refitted vessels, installations and in company offices. The information that is potentially accessible to those with intent to cause harm and damage is extensive and frequently unprotected. In this technologically dependent age, security structures should include robust cyber security measures.

Effective control of security emergencies demands rapid and decisive actions. The appropriateness and speed of response to a security situation will have a direct bearing on the outcome, potentially saving lives, preventing injuries and minimising the impact of the emergency situation. These measures can be broken down into passive and active defence mechanisms which can aid a ship’s master and crew, installation or office manager and staff in maintaining the security integrity of their vessel and building.

The physical maritime security environment is essentially divided into low and high risk operating areas; cyber security is not bounded by physical location of the threat origin or the target. Generally, in the current geopolitical conditions, the safer operating areas and those with a higher security threat risk are well known to the industry. However, the nature of populist social unrest which typifies the modern political landscape is hard to predict and short notice changes to security threat levels should be expected. Contingency plans should be put in place to enable those onboard and ashore to respond effectively to changing security requirements. This becomes even more important when it applies to remote locations at the end of extended supply lines. Intelligence and information on security threat levels is available from official sources and private security specialists. It is recommended that company security officers (CSOs)/managers establish effective communication with such bodies to ensure that their risk assessments are based on the most up to date and relevant security threat intelligence. Any relevant information should be forwarded to masters or security officers so that they are in a position to make equally well informed security risk assessments.

Contents

• Glossary
• Introduction
• Scope
• General Considerations for Security and Emergency Response
• Terrorism, Piracy and Violent Criminal Acts
• Hostage Taking and Kidnapping
• Stowaways
• Bomb Threats
• Sources of Information and Guidance
• Appendix 1 – Example of Telephone Bomb Threat – Aide-Mémoire